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I. INTRODUCTION
t is only reasonable to assume that dissimilar legal systems possess
dissimilar patterns of legal reasoning. Inasmuch as two legal systems
differ in their structure and function, they also differ in the types of
arguments they employ in their service. It may well be argued that law is,
in the final analysis, the product of the premises and methods from and
through which it is derived. Two such legal systems which display a vast
difference in their overall structure and function are Islamic law and the
common law.' This paper proposes to shed some light on the logic of legal
*Assistant Professor of Islamic Law and Theology, Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill
University, Montreal; B.A., Haifa University, Israel; M.A. and Ph.D., University of Wash-
ington. I should like to record my thanks to Professors Marjorie Rombauer, John Haley, and
James Hardisty of the University of Washington Law School for their helpful comments on
the common law part of this paper.
I Islamic law and the common law are treated here synchronically rather than di-
achronically. The convenient point of departure, insofar as this paper is concerned, is the
phase of intellectual maturity of both systems falling in Islamic law, in the period after the
tenth century A.D., and in common law, in the end of the last century and the present one. It
is not implied that common law could reach intellectual maturity only toward the end of the
nineteenth century; the concern of this paper is with analytical jurisprudence and the role of
logic in law. Therefore, one cannot speak of such mature theory in common law before the
latter part of the past century.
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reasoning in both orders as well as to analyze the reasons and background
which give rise to differences and similarities in their methods of reason-
ing. This will be done with the intent of bringing out some of the major
factors which operate on the level of the judicial process and which con-
tribute to the creation of differences in legal orders. The focal comparison
in such a study must be the relationship between the logic of the law and
the amount of emphasis given to social change in secular and religious
cultures.
This, it must be pointed out, is a preliminary investigation which
awaits a more thorough and comprehensive study-primarily because
legal logic in Islam has not yet been analyzed, and our knowledge of the
methods of legal reasoning subsumed under what is commonly known as
qiyds is still rudimentary. This is particularly evident from the fact that,
with very few exceptions, modern scholars of Islamic law translate qiyds
as analogy without realizing the existence of other arguments (e.g., a
fortiori argument in both its forms, the a minori ad maius and a maiori
ad minus, reductio ad absurdum and induction) which are comprised by
that nomenclature. This paper is not aimed at arguing for the existence of
these arguments in qiyds; rather, it presupposes them. This presupposi-
tion, however, is fully justified by the sources cited herein. 2
By way of introduction, it must be noted that the general attitude of
Islamic and common law lawyers 3 towards logic cannot be described as
positive. Although lawyers from both systems find logic an indispensable
tool for the systematization and consistency of legal concepts and doc-
trines, logic generally remains suspect.4 Surely, in each case, this attitude
is the result of different causes. The Islamic lawyer resists logic because
he views it as an offshoot of Greek philosophy. For him the unqualified
acceptance of logic entails the acceptance of metaphysical conclusions
which run against the fundaments of his belief as Muslim. Only when
logic is stripped from its theological implications and used merely as a
tool does the Islamic lawyer consider it legitimate.
In common law, logic is also rejected whenever it is conceived as a
2 Subsequent to the submission of this Article to press, further investigation of the
arguments subsumed under qiyas led to the conclusion that, to the exclusion of the argmen-
turn e contrario, which was considered as a linguistic argument, qiyds encompassed the
arguments enumerated above. For a documented account of this investigation, see the au-
thor's Non-Analogical Arguments, in SUNNI JURIDICAL QYAS (forthcoming).
3 For purposes of convenience, the terms "lawyers," "Judges," and "jurists" will be used
loosely in this paper. The judges are primarily responsible for the development of common
law, while the jurists undertake such a responsibility in Islam. Islamic law, like Roman law,
is jurists' law. Despite usages such as "the Islamic lawyer," this distinction must always be
kept in mind. On Islamic law as jurists' law, see J. SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC
LAw 209 (Oxford 1964); Weiss, Interpretation in Islamic Law: The Theory ofljtihad, 26 AM. J.
CoMP. L. 199, 201-03 (1978).
4 H.J.M. BouKEmA, JUDING 180 (1980); Goldziher, The Attitude of Orthodox Islam
bward the "Ancient Sciences," in STuDurns ON IsLAM 198-209 (M.L. Swartz ed. & trans.
Oxford 1981); Guest, Logic in the Law, in OxFoRD ESSAYS ON JURISPRUDENCE 176 (1961);
Simitis, The Problem of Legal Logic, 3 RATIO 1, 94 (1960).
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rigorous tool of inference. Of great concern are the results to which logic
may lead against the constantly changing social reality. Law, Justice
Holmes said, is "the resultant of a conflict at every point between logic
and good sense-the one striving to work fiction out to consistent results,
the other restraining and at last overcoming that effort when the results
become too manifestly unjust. ' 5 By this statement, Justice Holmes im-
plied that logic brings about formal consistency of concepts irrespective of
the consequences when applied to concrete matters of fact. The heart of
the problem, common law lawyers argue, is compromising the necessary
logical deduction from non-contemporaneous premises with contempo-
rary problems, while simultaneously taking into account social and eth-
ical questions. 6 Although this is a major problem facing the common law
lawyer, the question of the serviceability of logic in law as a normative
system7 constitutes yet another insurmountable difficulty. 7b this last
point we shall return later.
II. ROLE OF LOGIC
Although the notion of "high authority" as a source of law lingers in the
background of the common legal tradition, it would be accurate here, for
all intents and purposes, to state that common law is rooted in, or grafted
to, sociology. As such, it is to be construed in sociological terms. Common
law is an instrument of social control and its relevance to society is an
ever-present element in the mind of counsel as well as of the court. On the
other hand, law in Islam is conceived not as a means employed in the
service of society, but, rather, in the service of God, who alone knows what
is best for society. Islamic law delineates the dictates of divine will, and it
is perceived as the ideal way in which man can worship his Creator. It is
an all-encompassing law which covers every conceivable human act, from
liturgical forms to neighborly conduct, to partnership and homicide. Its
sources are the Quran, the Sunna of the Prophet, the consensus of the
community and its scholars, and the method of inference known as qiyds.
Through the latter, which is the primary concern of this paper, the law is
derived from the former three sources. Whatever these sources dictate
becomes the law governing all Muslims. The changing social reality, at
least in theory, has no effect whatsoever on the process of judicial reason-
5 Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 20 (1924).
6 J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS' REASONINGS 285-86 (1964); J. STONE, THE
PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 170 (1946).
1 As a normative system, law contains propositions which function as major premises
in syllogistics. Norms are not statements; therefore, they are neither true nor false. The
difficulty stems from this very fact because the validity of deductive logic hinges on the
necessary relation between the truth of the premises and the truth of the conclusion. See C.
WELLMAN, Deduction in Legal and Moral Reasoning, in REASONING ON LEGAL REASONING
193 (A. Peczenik and J. Uusitalo eds. Helsinki 1979); Guest, supra note 4, at 183-86. For a
general discussion of the normative character of law, see F CASTBERG, PROBLEMS OF LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 24 (Oslo 1957).
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ing. Only when these religious sources enjoin the protection of a certain
human need does the law allow for that need and for those analogous to it.
Should this need change because of new circumstances and conditions,
the Islamic lawyer stands helpless in the face of the omnipotent sources.
For example, one cannot alter a rule based on an explicit textual injunc-
tion and still characterize that rule as Islamic. Islamic law is not a law
enacted by Muslims; rather, it is enacted by God, for Muslims. Human
reason cannot make law; it only functions as the means by which law is
discovered. Thus, instead of being organically tied to social exigencies,
Islamic law is rooted in divine volition and authority, whether or not this
authority takes cognizance of social reality.
Legal reasoning in common law thus differs from its Islamic counter-
part in that it is bound by facts and norms which, while relevant to the
conclusion, are not entirely intrinsic to the premises. Reasoning in com-
mon law recognizes the validity of a legal norm (conclusion) although
such norm may not follow entirely from the given, established rules
(premises). Admittedly, this somewhat lax procedure is often insisted
upon in common law in exchange for a more mutable and flexible law. In
Islamic law, on the other hand, the jurist is bound only by those premises
which are prescribed by the religious sources, and, unless a certain ambi-
guity in the premises allows the inclusion or exclusion of certain material
facts, nothing that does not follow from the premises can or should be
joined to the conclusion.
Common law lawyers conceive logic as the organ by which one seeks to
discover the conditions under which a conclusion follows from given
premises. In other words, logic is viewed as concerned with the validity of
the conclusion as it relates to the premises from which it is derived.
Common law lawyers, interested as much in the truthfulness and validity
of the legal premises and their relevance to changing situations, have
always attempted to curb the overuse of formal logic in law. Although to a
certain extent Muslim lawyers expressed their own reservations about
logic, they have been considerably less successful in resisting the influ-
ence of logic on law.
II1. TYPES OF ARGUMENTS USED IN BOTH COMMON LAW AND ISLAMIC
LAW
A. Deduction
Admittedly, both legal systems use deductive logic, particularly when
general principles and rules are laid down.8 Under a broad principle, the
8 O.C. JENSEN, THE NATURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 25 (1957); R. CROSS, PRECEDENT IN
ENGLISH LAW (3rd ed. Oxford 1977); ABU HAMID AL-GRAmzAL, MICYAR AL-cILM Fl FANN AL-
MAN Q 154 (H. Sharara ed. Beirut 1966); IBN AL-HAJIB, MUiASAR AL-MUNTAHA AL-
Usoe 9-16 (Cairo 1326 H.); Abdel-Rahman, La Place du Syllogisme Juridique dana la
[Vol. 34:79
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judge subsumes the case which needs a solution, and applies the general
legal principle to that particular case. Such an operation, though purely
deductive, seems so intuitive that one need not be thoroughly familiar
with logic to conduct it. When it is established, for instance, that things
intoxicating are forbidden in the Quran, little analysis is needed to reach
the rule that whisky, vodka, etc., are forbidden by law. Similarly, it takes
common sense to deduce from Quran V:96 which reads, "And I permit to
you the catch of the sea . . .," that feeding on fish, shellfish, and other
animals which inhabit the sea is permissible. Judge Cardozo has asserted
that, when the Constitution or a statute supplies the rule which fits the
case, "the judge looks no further."9 In the works on Islamic legal theory
and jurisprudence, the role of deductive logic in the process of legal rea-
soning is seldom discussed. Perhaps this is because Muslim jurists reckon
that there is little mental endeavor involved in deductive-legal opera-
tions. For them it is simply a question of subsumption. In cases where
deduction is used, however, the role of the judge is still significant. To
reach a decision, the judge must first undertake the difficult task of estab-
lishing the exact meaning of the relevant law, and then ascertain its
applicability to the new case from a purely legal standpoint.
Perhaps as a result of the impact of modern formal logic, common law
lawyers, as well as other Western legal theorists, have gone well beyond
their Muslim counterparts in discussing the relevance of deductive logic
to law. An articulate treatment of this subject has not been undertaken in
Islam," although Western lawyers have dealt with it somewhat unsuc-
cessfully. The judgment that A is guilty of offense X and must therefore be
punished by Y can be a conclusion of a syllogism in which the major
premise is a statute and the minor premise is a set of facts about A. This
conclusion certainly differs from the conclusion in the classic syllogism
'"All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; therefore, Socrates is mortal." The
latter conclusion is a factual statement, whereas the former's factuality
hinges upon several conditions yet to be fulfilled. Such a distinction be-
tween legal and non-legal syllogism does not seem to disturb some com-
mon law lawyers. Sir Rupert Cross, for instance, has observed that "[olne
allowance must certainly be made for this distinction, but it may yet be
the case that there is a sufficient resemblance between the methods by
which the conclusion is reached to justify the description of each of them
as an example of deductive reasoning."" The acceptance of non-factual or
Mthode Exgdtique chez Gazali, in LE RAMONNEMENT JURIDIQUE 185-94 (H. Hubien ed.
Bruxelles 1971). See also infra note 43 (further on the deductive character of some qiyds
arguments).
9 B. CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 14 (1964).
10 Two of the few jurists who discussed this problem are Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and Taqi
al-dift Ibn Thymiyya. See supra note 8 and infra notes 37 & 48.
1 R. CROSS, supra note 8, at 178.
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normative statements in legal deduction is the result of the fact that the
logic of norms has not yet been worked out.u
The lack of a practical solution for this and other problems' 3 in deduc-
tive legal reasoning has prevented common law lawyers from dwelling too
long on them. Deduction remains the most central, though by no means
the only, method by which general legal principles are applied to ques-
tions of fact. Notwithstanding all difficulties, both legal systems find de-
duction an indispensable tool of legal reasoning.
In addition to syllogistics, both Muslim and common law lawyers use
other arguments which take the form of deduction. The first is reductio ad
absurdum, which is often used to reach a conclusion about a case by
making a certain assumption and then proving that this assumption con-
tradicts an established legal norm. The judge asserts, for instance, that X
is a goal that the law ought to promote; but Y impedes, or would impede,
the realization of X; therefore, Y ought to be prevented by law. Another
instance of this argument may be the assertion that X is a goal which the
law ought to promote; accepting Y as legal would defeat the realization of
X; therefore, Y ought not be legally recognized. This argument abounds
in both legal systems. 14 Also very common is the a fortiori argument by
which a law governing a certain situation is extended to another more
obvious situation. This is of two types: a minori ad maius and a maiori ad
minus. An example of the first type is the inference from the Quranic
injunction "Say not 'fie' to them (i.e., to parents) nor repulse them, but
speak to them graciously"'15 that mistreating or beating parents is forbid-
den. Here the legal norm is transferred from a limited act to a more
general one. The second type requires a reversal of this process, i.e., from
the general to the particular. For instance, from the rule that the con-
sumption of large quantities of wine is prohibited, it is ruled that the
drinking of the smallest particle of wine is also prohibited.16
12 Guest, supra note 4, at 185; Summers, Logic in the Law, 72 MIND 257 (1963).
13 Following Aulis Aarnio, Carl Wellman has succinctly analyzed eight problems which
arise in legal as well as moral deductive reasoning. See C. WELLMAN, supra note 7, at
193-98.
14 M. GOLDING, LEGAL REASONING 55-60 (1984). Muslim jurists term this argument
qiyds al-caks, and logicians qiyds al-khulf. See SAYF AL-DIN AL-AMIDI, III AL-IHKAM F1
USOL AL-AnKAM 3 (Cairo 1968); ABu HAMiD AL-GHAzAu, supra note 8, at 118-19; IBN AL-
HAjim, supra note 8, at 15; IBN ABi AL-SALT AL-DANI, TAQWIM AL-DHAHN 48 (C.G. Palencia
ed. Madrid 1915). The application of this argument is also evident in the formulation of the
general principle of maqdsid (or rnaqsd) al-shar' (the aims of the law). See, e.g., ABU-
ISHAQ AL-SHATHI, 11 AL-MuwAFAQAT FI USOL AL-AnKAM 127-28 (Cairo 1970); SAYF AL-
DiN AL-AMIDI, III al-Ihkdm fi Usal al-Ahkdm 71-76 (Cairo 1968); MUHAMMAD B. CA.L4 AL-
SHAwKAN, IRsHAD AL-FuHOL aA TAHQIQ AL-HAQQ MIN CILM AL-USOL 214 (Cairo 1909).
1Quran XVII:23.
16 Later Muslim scholars often refer to the a fortiori argument as bil-ahra. Shfi'i, the
"master architect" of Islamic jurisprudence, uses it but under the general term qiyds. See S.
RIsALI, ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 307-08 (M. Khadduri trans. 1961) (It is to be cautioned that
Khadduri consistently translates qiyds as analogy); IBN HABIB AL-MAwANDI, I ADAB AL-
[Vol. 34:79
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The nature of law and its sources in the Islamic and common legal
traditions make it difficult to work out legal concepts solely by means of
formal arguments. Lawyers from both systems have acknowledged that
deduction is only one of several arguments employed in legal reasoning. 7
Primarily, the lack of universal or general principles contributes chiefly
to the relegation of strictly formal arguments to a secondary, often negli-
gible, position. Despite the increasing entrenchment of the legislature on
the common law, case law still constitutes the major segment of the com-
mon law system. Similarly, Islamic law is characterized by its concern
with individual cases rather than with general precepts, a resultant man-
ifestation of the material structure of its two primary sources: the Quran
and the Sunna. The Quran was revealed to Muhammad piecemeal in
order to fulfill and answer the specific needs which arose during the
period of his Mission. Likewise, the Sunna, expressed in a collection of
reports of the utterances and deeds of the Prophet, came to answer similar
needs in later times. Characteristically, these two sources deal with spe-
cific issues and, strictly speaking, contain relatively few general legal
principles. It is therefore clear that, like common law, Islamic law is, in a
large measure, case law. This fact determines the type of argument and
logic which best fits and serves common case law and Islamic law.
B. Legal Analogy
One of the most commonly used arguments in both systems, and one
which answers most of the law's needs, is reasoning from part to part or
case to case, an argument known as legal analogy'18 The basic course of
reasoning is the extension of a legal rule from one case to another due to a
similarity which is deemed by the judge to be a material similarity. The
form of this argument is as follows:
A has the properties X, Y ....
B has the properties X, Y ....
A has the rule J
X, Y... are relevant properties in inducing J.
Therefore, B must have the rule J.
Such an argument gives rise to serious problems. For the logician, this
argument, however meticulous it may seem, remains imperfect at best.
QADI 587-92 (Baghdad 1971); IMAM AL-HARAMAYN AL-JUWAYNI, AL-WARAQAT (printed with
the commentary of Jalal al-Din al-Mahalli, on the margin of SHAWKANI, supra note 14, at
199-200) (Cairo 1909)).
17 C. WELLMAN, supra note 7, at 193. See the types of arguments as discussed by ABu
HAMID AL-GAzALi, supra note 8, at 102-37.
I SAYFAL-DIN AL-AMmI, supra note 14, at 3-10; L. CARTER, REASON rN LAw 12 (1984); E.
LEvi, AN INTRODUCTION To LEGAL REASONING 1-2 (1949).
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Muslim logicians and philosophers discard it because it is conjectural and
merely leads to probable (zanni) knowledge. The Muslim and common
law lawyers, while realizing its shortcomings, have no choice but to accept
it. Undoubtedly, they have striven, within the limits imposed by the
nature of such an argument, to strengthen it by supporting arguments
with a view toward realizing its utmost potential. The crucial problem
posed is determining the element of similarity which justifies the trans-
ference of the rule of one case to another. For it is this element which
determines the validity of the conclusion. 19 How, in light of such consid-
erations, the common element in analogy is decided in Islamic and com-
mon law is perhaps the most illustrative differentiation, not only of the
legal reasoning in both systems, but also of their function and goal.
Whether it is taken to be "[t]he ground or reason of decision," or "[tihe
point in a case which determines the judgment, '20 or, as the Muslim jurist
would put it, "that which induces the judgment, '21 the ratio decidendi and
the Islamic cilla (the relevant similarity which justifies the transference
of the judgment from the precedent to the new case) have remained the
most illusive doctrines in common law and Islamic law. In Britain and the
United States, this doctrine has been a major concern of a number of
experts since the beginning of this century; in Islam, it occupied major
portions of jurisprudential theories for several centuries. The first major
attempt at defining the rules for finding the ratio of a case was made by
Professor Goodhart in 1930. He concluded that the ratio is neither found
in the reasons given in the judge's opinion nor in the rule of law set forth
in that opinion. Nor is it necessarily found by a consideration of all the
ascertainable facts of the case and the judge's decision. Rather, Goodhart
argued, the ratio is to be found by taking account of (1) the facts treated by
the judge as material, and (2) his decision as based on them. In finding the
ratio it is also necessary to establish what facts are held to be material by
the judge.22 In other words, Goodhart proposes that a later court is bound
by the presumably applicable precedent and its ruling, as an outcome of
the judge's consideration of the material facts determined in the earlier
case.
19 The German scholar Urlich Klug properly remarked that the difficulty in using
analogical argument lies in the obscurity of the distinction between essential and unessen-
tial respects. See J. HoRovrrz, LAW AND LOGIC 32 (1972).
20 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1135 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). See also R. CROss, supra note 8, at
76-79 (adopts any rule of law expressly or impliedly treated by the judge as a necessary step
in reaching a conclusion and discusses means of ascertaining the ratio decidendi from a
case).
21 See, e.g., ABu HuSAYN AL-BASal, U AL-MutrAMAD F1 USuL AL-FIQH 704-05 (Damas-
cus 1964-65); MuHAmMAD j3. cAu AL-SHAwKANi, supra note 14, at 207.
22 Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 (1930). A
summary of this article may be found in Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD.
L. REV. 117 (1959).
[Vol. 34:79
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After lengthy polemics in the Modern Law Review about the ratio de-
cidendi,23 Professor Julius Stone argued that Goodhart was attempting to
set forth a prescriptive theory rather than a descriptive account for deter-
mining the ratio decidendi.24 Stone found this unacceptable. He main-
tained that in each precedent there is implicit a number of ratio
decidendi, and it is left to the deciding judges to determine, in light of
current exigencies (e.g., public policy, ethics, justice), the "appropriate
level of generality" in the precedent which must prevail in the new case. 25
It is not the material facts in the earlier case which must dictate the
decision of the later court but rather "the analogical relevance of the prior
holding to the later case," which requires "the later court to choose be-
tween possibilities presented by the earlier case. '26 Representing what
may be termed "the sociological school of jurisprudence," Stone emphat-
ically argued that the later court is the final arbiter of which ratio is
applicable to the case in question.27
In short a "rule" or "principle" as it emerges from a precedent
case is subject in its further elaboration to continual review, in the
light of analogies and differences, not merely in the logical rela-
tions between fact situations, and the problems springing from
these; but also in the light of the import of these analogies and
differences for what is thought by the later court to yield a tolera-
bly acceptable result in terms of "policy," "ethics," "justice," "ex-
pediency" or whatever other norm of desirability the law may be
thought to subserve. No ineluctable logic, but a composite of the
logical relations seen between legal propositions, of observation of
facts and consequences, and of value-judgments about the accept-
ability of these consequences, is what finally comes to bear upon
the alternatives with which "the rule of stare decises" confronts
the courts, and especially appellate courts. And this, it may be
supposed, is why finally we cannot assess the product of their
work in terms of any less complex quality than that of wisdom.28
Thus, "wisdom" and, as Justice Holmes stated, "good sense," must be
employed in determining the ratio rather than a mechanical or fixed set of
2 Some of the articles include: Goodhart, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 22 MOD. L.
REv. 117 (1959); Montrose, The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REv. 587 (1957);
Montrose, Ratio Decidendi and the House of Lords, 20 MOD. L. REv. 124 (1957); Simpson,
The Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 20 MOD. L. REv. 413 (1957); Simpson, Ratio Decidendi of a
Case, 21 MoD. L. REv. 155 (1958).
1 Stone, The Ratio of the Ratio Decidendi, 22 MOD. L. REV. 597 (1959). For a useful
summary of the main thesis of this article, see J. FARRAR, INTRODUCTION To LEGAL METHOD
69-71 (1977).
25 Stone, supra note 24, at 618.
2 Id. at 604-05.
27 Id. at 618.
2 Id.
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logical rules.29 The lack of serious attempts in the Anglo-American legal
tradition to "prescribe" methods by which a ratio of a case can be decided
is an eloquent testimony to the disinterest of common law lawyers in a
permanently defined and inflexible set of rules which might control and
limit the ability of law to adapt itself to the changing reality.
30
On the other hand, the Islamic lawyers, being acutely conscious of the
religious character of their law, stress the dictates of the sources of law
rather than the needs of the new cases to which they seek to find the
"sound" solutions. Divinity has expressed its will in the Quran and sunna
which are deemed not only the ideal guides in man's life but also the final
revelation to mankind. Thus, insofar as deciding a new case is concerned,
the Muslim jurist can operate on two levels which are determined by the
nature of these two sources. On the first level, the jurist is bound by the
explicit textual statements and commands. What determines the judg-
ment in the new case is solely the explicit ratio in the original text, i.e.,
the precedent. There is little latitude for deciding the case in light of
current exigencies. On the second level, however, the jurist is allowed a
certain, although limited, freedom of interpretation in deciding the new
case, due to the ambiguous nature of the textual precedents.
This paper is not concerned with the linguistic principles which come
into play in determinating the cilla; it focuses on the logical and perhaps
semi-logical tools employed for this purpose. The first condition set forth
for finding and establishing the cilla is its efficiency, that is, its causal
relationship with the judgment. The property or properties which con-
stitute the cilla must bring about a judgment. Joining an inefficient prop-
erty to the cilla will no doubt spoil that cilla. Intoxication, for instance, is
an efficient property which necessitates the judgment of prohibiting the
consumption of wine. Should it be assumed that redness is a property
which together with intoxication effects the judgment of prohibiting red
wine, it must then always be assumed that in any judgment of prohibiting
29 Id. at 619.
30 The increasing concern with the flexibility of law brought about certain changes in
the effect of precedent in the House of Lords. In 1966, Lord Gardiner, the Lord Chancellor,
representing the Lords of Appeal in Ordinary, declared the following:
Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as an indispensable foundation
upon which to decide what is the law and its application to individual cases. It
provides at least some degree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in the
conduct of their affairs, as well as a basis for orderly development of legal rules.
Their Lordships nevertheless recognize that too rigid adherence to precedent
may lead to injustice in a particular case and also unduly restrict the proper
development of the law. They propose therefore to modify their present practice
and, while treating former decision of this House as normally binding, to depart
from a previous decision when it appears right to do so.
M. ZANDER, THE LAw-MAKING PROCESS 104 (1980).
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intoxicants the property of redness must be present in conjunction with
the property of intoxication. Otherwise, the cilia which is extended to a
new case, say white wine, becomes invalid because the property of redness
is inefficient due to its absence from white wine, while the same judgment
of prohibition remains in effect. Since part of the cilia has no efficiency
beyond the case of red wine, the cilia as a whole is rendered invalid.31
The second method is coextensiveness (the presence of the cilia when
the judgment is present) and coexclusiveness (the absence of the cilia
when the judgment is absent).3 2 Like efficiency, this method seeks to
emphasize the causal connection between the judgment and its cilia. A
valid causal relationship must have both the coexistence of the cause and
its effect and the absence of one when the other is absent. This method
also guarantees the exclusion of an additional, unnecessary cilia. If two
different illas are claimed to induce the judgment, it is inconceivable that
when one cilia becomes absent, the judgment becomes absent as well. 33
In conjunction with these methods, Muslim jurists employ a third the-
ory which may be termed the "joined method of difference and agree-
ment. 13 4 By the method' of difference, it is demonstrated that certain
properties, say A, B, C.... constitute the only difference between the cilia
in the precedent and the cilia in the new case. It is then proved that these
properties are inefficient and irrelevant in inducing the judgment. In
other words, such an analogy first assumes the total sum of differences
between the cillas X and Y are A, B, C .... The second premise is that A,
B, C... have no weight insofar as the judgment, J, is concerned. Since X
and Y are identical save for A, B, C..., J is the judgment.
As a prerequisite to the method of difference, the method of agreement
must come into play. By this method, the similarity between X and Y is
found. Then the judgment of the precedent is transferred to the new
case. 35 The method of difference and agreement can be implemented only
by use of what the logicians call disjunctive and conjunctive syllogism.
Put schematically, the course of reasoning by analogy is as follows:
P has properties A, B, C, D, E, F.
Q has properties A, B, C, D, E.
P has the rule J.
F is not a property in Q.
A, B, and C are not relevant similarities.
D and E are relevant similarities and efficient in J.
31 ABu H sAYN AL-BA I, supra note 21, at 789-90.
32 CALI SAmI AL-NASHSHAR, MANAi AL-BAHTH cmDA MuFAKAuu AL-IsLAm 111 (Cairo
1966).
33 Id. at 112.
3 This is reminiscent of Mill's methods of agreement and difference. See E. NAGIEL,
JOHN STUART MILL'S PHILOSOPHY OF ScIErTcrC METHOD 211 (1974).
3 MuHAqmn B. CAL AL-SHLwiAm, supra note 21, at 213-14, 219, 220-22.
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D and E are present when J is present and absent
when J is absent.
Therefore, Q has (or must have) the rule J.
The effort expended in establishing the relevant similarity which, in
turn, determines the validity of transferring a judgment of one case to
another must be seen in light of the conflict between formal logic and the
actual needs of the law. Both Western and Muslim lawyers recognize the
insuperable difficulties encountering conclusions by analogy. Some ide-
alists in the West have gone so far as to say that a conclusion by analogy
can be valid only after modus barbara.36 The Muslim logician, Farabi,
also argued that to be valid, analogy must be converted to the following
syllogistic form: All S's are X's; all A's are S's; therefore, all A's are X's.
This is so, he insisted, because valid analogy amounts to syllogistic in-
ference. And when a syllogism cannot serve, analogy cannot be valid.37
However, the imprecise nature of legal propositions and the law's actual
requirements prevent jurists from accepting, much less adopting, such
arguments. In real life it is rarely possible to ascertain conclusively the
exact similitude between all aspects of two cases. Thus, to convert an
analogy to strict syllogism would be tantamount to forging a link which
is justified neither by the facts in the precedents or in the new case.
Another argument to which Muslim and common law lawyers resort is
argumentum e contrario.38 In analogy, the two cases possess a similarity
which justifies extending the rule from the precedent to the new case. In
the argumentum e contrario, the absence of such a link and the di-
ametrical opposition of the two cases brings about a conclusion. 39 The
argument may take one of two forms. The first is "S is a P; therefore, no
non-S is a P." An example of this may be the following: From the rule that
several legal residences are allowed for private persons, it is inferred that
several legal residences are not allowed for corporations.40 The second
a6 See the discussion in Simitis, supra note 4, at 70; Abu Nasr al-Farfbi, Kitdb al-Qiyds
al-Saghtr, in 16 REVUE DE LA FACULTIkS DES LANGUES, D'HISTOIRE, ET DE GLOGRAPHIE DE
L'UNIVERSIT5r D'ANKARA 266-68 (1958); AL-FARABI'S SHORT COMMENTARY ON ARISTOTLE'S
PRIOR ANALYTIcs 93-98 (N. Rescher trans. 1963).
37 Abu Nasr al-Farabi, supra note 36, at 267-68; AL-FARAm's SHORT COMMENTARY,
supra note 36, at 95. Also see the argument of ABu HAm AL-GHAZALI, supra note 8, at
123-25; ABu-M m AL-GHAZALI, MmiAKK AL-NAzAR 31 (Cairo - ). Urlich Klug also
argues that in sound analogy the minor premise is subsumed under the major premise just
as in any syllogism. Horovitz agrees and argues that analogical inference eventually reverts
to syllogism and has no special logical structure of its own. See J. HoRovrrz, supra note 19,
at 33.
18 SAYF AL-DiN AL-AMux, supra note 14, at 3; J. FARRAR, supra note 24, at 50-51; J.
HoRovrrz, supra note 19, at 44.
19 ABU HusAYN AL-BAssI, supra note 21, at 698-99; Anu HUSAYN AL-BAsI, KrrAB AL-
QIYAS AL-SIARci, printed with AL-Mu-rAmaAD 1031-32.
40 J. HoRovrrz, supra note 19, at 44.
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form, often claimed to be the most important argument in Islamic law
after analogy," may be best illustrated by the well-known example about
the purity-or impurity-of pets. The ruling that dogs are impure is
reached on the basis of a Prophetic report making the Prophet refrain
from visiting a residence in which a dog is present, but allowing him to
visit another residence in which there is a cat. The Prophet then remarks
that "(the cat) is not impure." This statement, coupled with the fact that
he withheld his visit to the residence of the dog's owner, led to the conclu-
sion that dogs are impure.42
C. Induction
The last of the major arguments common to both systems is induction 43
which, unlike deduction or analogy, bases itself more often than not on
conclusions reached by other arguments. Except for a relatively few cases
in the Quran and the Sunna where ready-made solutions are given, cases
in Islamic law are ordinarily solved either through analogy from case to
case, or by deduction through the subsumption of a case under a general
41 ABU HUsAYN AL-BAsRI, supra note 39, at 1031-32; SAYF AL-DIN AL-AMIDI, supra note
14, at 3.
42 ABU HusAYN AL-BASRu, supra note 39, at 1036.
43 Guest, supra note 4, at 188-90; ABu-HAmu AL-GHAzALI, supra note 37, at 62-63.
Notably, Muslim legal theoreticians do not always agree with regard to the types of argu-
ments subsumed under qiyds. Only in a few works, such as those of Abu Nasr al-Farabi, Abu
Hamid al-Gha2ali, and Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyya is one presented with more or less a full
account of these arguments. However, a close examination of the definitions of qiyds in the
jurists' writings reveals that these definitions are left broad enough to allow the inclusion of
many types of arguments. Some of the common definitions of qiyds are the following: (1)
"predicating a known thing to another (known thing) on grounds of a common matter [i.e.
cause] in order to establish, or negate, a rule for both of them" (hamlu maclrmin caMd
ma'ldmin fi ithbati hukmin lahum aw nafyihi canhumd bi'amrin jamicin baynahuma min
hukmin aw sifa); (2) "applying the rule of the precedent to the new case on grounds of a
similarity between the two cases" (ta hs flu hukmi al-ali fi al-far~i li'shtibdhihimd fi 'illati al-
hukmi); (3) "the subsumption of a particular under a general" (idrdju khuszasin fi 'umflm).
MuHAmmAD B. cA AL-SHAwKANi, supra note 14, at 198. See also ABu AL-WALID AL-BAJI,
AL-HUDOD FI AL-USOL 69-70 (N. Hammad ed. 1973). For other, but similar, definitions, see F.
KIOLEIF, A STUDY ON FAKHR AL-DIN AL-RAiz 151-52 (1966).
Such definitions are indicative of the inclusiveness of qiyds. In his chapter on legal
reasoning, 'Abd al-Jabbdr notes that the form of judicial qiyds does not differ from that of
non-juridical qiyds (wa-tariqatu al-qiydsi al-shar'iyi ld tukhdlifu s ratuhd s,rata al-qiydsi "
al-'aqli). Ghazili held the same view and added that the difference between the two is only
in the premises. 'The premises which are good for rational qiyds are good for juridical qiyds,
but not all the premises which are good for juridical qiyds are good for rational qiyds" (14
mukhdlafata baynahumd fIt szarati al-qiydsi wa'innama yatakhdlafani i al-mddati, bal rnd
yasluhu an yakfina muqaddimatan ft al-'aqliyydti ya.luhu lil-fiqhiyydti, waldkin qad ya.luh
U lil-fiqhiyydti ma la yasluhu Iil-'aqliyydti). cABD AL-JABBAR AL-AsADABADi, XVII AL-
MUGHNI Fl ABwAB AL-TAWHID wAL-CAuL 280 (Cairo 1963). See ABu HArem AL-GRAZALI,
supra note 8, at 154. See also author's article Non-Analogical Arguments, in SUNNI
JURIDICAL QiyAS (forthcoming).
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principle. In induction, the common rule for a number of cases is extended
to another case because this case is similar or identical in relevant as-
pects. Induction is then possible only when a number of identical cases
exist. The form of the argument is: A, B, C, D. . .are cases which have the
common characteristic X and the rule J; all cases which have the charac-
teristic X must have the rule J; S has the characteristic X; therefore, S
has (or must have) the rule J. A concrete example of induction from
Islamic substantive law is the case of interest (ribd). The Prophet was said
to have prohibited the exchange of gold for gold, silver for silver, date for
date, wheat for wheat, and barley for barley unless they were equal in
quantities and delivered immediately. The cilla for this prohibition was
determined (e.g., in the HIanafi School) to be their nature as fungible
commodities sold by weight and measure. For this reason, exchange by
unequal amounts was prohibited." In accordance with this line of reason-
ing, all goods possessing this cilla, such as raisins, must be subject to
prohibition if exchanged under the aforementioned conditions.
The question then becomes: What differentiates induction from anal-
ogy in legal reasoning? The legitimacy of this question derives from the
fact that the relevant similarity between the new case and the already
solved cases is the same. This being so, an analogy between the new case
and a single precedent would suffice. However, the common law lawyers
would object that the extention of the rule by induction leads to a degree
of certainty which is higher than that attained in analogy. The multi-
plicity of cases (instances) gives inductive support to the rule of the new
case which analogical inference fails to provide. Thus, as in scientific
induction, legal induction in common law belongs to a class of arguments
superior to that of analogy; it stands in the middle position between
analogical and deductive arguments.
In Islamic law, induction ranks even higher on the scale of certainty. It
can be complete (perfect), leading to the same degree of certainty yielded
by deduction. The entire corpus of common law is, as a practical matter,
unlimited, making complete induction infeasible. In Islam, however, the
sources of the law are defined and exhaustible. A complete enumeration of
the instances supporting or negating a point of law yields the highest
degree of certain knowledge about that point, provided counter-evidence
does not exist. In the context of religion where a single explicit statement
in the sources has a force of finality, it may be argued that multiple
propositions should lead to a degree of certainty at least tantamount to
that yielded by deduction. Such an inductive process would simply con-
stitute a multi-deductive argument. For this reason a number of Muslim
jurists hold complete legal induction to have a force equal to deductive
arguments. However, even when incomplete, induction derives its force
' cA4 ALLAM B. MAUDOD AL-MusHI, II AL-IK-TIYAR LI-TACLIL AL-MuKHTR 30-33
(Cairo 1951).
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from the relative number of instances which can be observed with regard
to a particular case. "The larger the number of pieces of textual evidence
is, the stronger our knowledge becomes."45
In addition to its function as a method of reasoning, induction in Isla-
mic law plays the significant role of reinforcing uncertain or weak prem-
ises. The equivalent of such a role is not to be found in common law. In the
Islamic legal system, uncertain propositions from the Sunna (which alone
constitutes the greatest bulk of the legal sources) may gain an added
aggregate support by use of the inductive method, transforming them
into certain premises.
How does this process work? To answer this question, it must first be
observed that the dicta of sunna are divided into two basic categories: the
mutawdtir and the ahddi. The mutawdtir traditions are transmitted by
countless persons who hear or see the Prophet say or do a certain thing.
The large number of transmitters makes it inconceivable that the wit-
nesses or the transmitters could have agreed on falsifying the report. Due
to the authenticity of such a report and the certitude surrounding its
transmission, the mutawdtir traditions are said to lead to certain knowl-
edge of what they contain. Traditions transmitted by fewer people than
those who have witnessed and transmitted the mutawdtir traditions are
called ahddi. The latter, when taken individually, do not lead to certain
knowledge of the information they convey. Accordingly, when used indi-
vidually as premises in an argument, a mutawdtir tradition with an
explicit meaning leads to certainty while an ahddi tradition with the
same clarity of meaning leads only to probable knowledge. Thus, rules
based on individual ahddi traditions are only tentative and experimental.
Many Muslim jurists, however, argue that ahddi traditions can lead to
certain knowledge if they are supported by other pieces of circumstantial
evidence (qard'in) which may include other traditions of the same type
and indecisive or ambiguous Quranic verses." These textual pieces of
evidence must, when interpreted, have the same meaning as the tradition
which they purport to support. Another precondition for reaching cer-
tainty in such an arrangement is the number of supporting traditions and
verses: They must be altogether as numerous as those in the mutawdtir
category. But unlike the latter which cannot, whether individually or
collectively, be dubious, an aIhddi tradition can only be probable insofar as
its authenticity is concerned. The aggregate of ahddis, however, cannot be
45 See ABu HAmm AL-GHAZALi, supra note 8, at 120.
46 Indicisive or ambiguous (mutashabihdt) verses are capable of more than one inter-
pretation. If an indecisive verse can be interpreted in such a way as to support the meaning
of an ahddi tradition, this verse is said to be a qarina, a supporting piece of evidence. An
unambiguous Quranic verse cannot be used as a qartna to support an ahddi tradition,
because, by itself, it constitutes indisputable evidence which need not be supported by any
qard'in (plural of qarina). However, a deductive or analogical argument based on an unam-
biguous verse can always become inductive if other ambiguous verses conveying the same
meaning are available.
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dubious because Muslim jurists reason that a multitude of reports trans-
mitted through so many channels and by so many transmitters who could
not have known each other cannot possibly constitute a lie or a conspiracy
in fabricating the report. In their multiplicity, the ahddi traditions gain a
strength tantamount to that of the mutawdtir.47
The doctrine of inductive support is undoubtedly the product of a com-
promising approach to blend the elements of form and material substance
in legal argument. Unlike the Aristotelian logicians who were primarily
concerned with form, Muslim jurists paid equal attention to the material
substance of the premises in relation to the degree of certainty to which
they can lead. The emphasis that Islamic law places on the premises as
the determinant of the degree of certainty of the conclusion may be illus-
trated by discussing the views of the influential Ibn Thymiyya on this
subject.
Ibn Taymiyya's argument must be seen as a response to the traditional
view which holds syllogistics superior to analogy. Against this view, he
argues that syllogism and analogy are equivalent because any analogical
argument can be converted to first figure syllogism.48 Writing in the Isla-
mic tradition, Ibn Taymiyya sees the analogical argument as consisting of
four terms: (1) the asl, the precedent which is extracted from the scrip-
ture; (2) the fare, the new case requiring a solution; (3) the cilla, the
similarity common to the as and the far ; and (4) the hukm, the rule
which is transferred from the former to the latter. The weakness of anal-
ogy does not lie in its form since it can be converted to syllogism. Rather,
the weakness lies in the material substance of the premises and, more
particularly, in the cilla. "If the subject matter (of the premises) is certain,
whether the form of the argument is analogy or syllogism, then (the
conclusion) is certain.' '49 For instance, should the jurist conclusively es-
tablish that the consumption of wine was forbidden in the Quran because
it is an intoxicant, he would be able to convert this possible analogy to a
syllogism in which the major premise is "All intoxicants are forbidden;"
the minor premise is "Vodka is an intoxicant;" the conclusion is "Vodka is
forbidden;" with the middle term being the property of intoxication.5°
41 ABu BAKR AL-SAnKiisI, I UsOL 292 (Abu al-Wafa al-Afgh&ni ed. Cairo 1372 H.);
BAYDAWI, II MnqHi AL-WusOL 197-205, with Sh. Ism&'il's IU TAHDHtB SHARH AL-ISNAWI
(especially last paragraph of p. 205) (Cairo 1976). In fact, ShAtibi went so far as to say that
induction is the only method by which certainty can be reached in law. See SHATIBi, I
MUWAFAQAT 10-15 (1969).
48 TAQI AL-DIN InN TAYMIYYA, JAHD AL-QARIHA Fi TAJRM AL-NAS.HA (an abridgement
by JALAL AL-DIN AL-Suy-UT OF NASIHAT AHL AL-IMAN Fi AL-RADD CALA MAI-TQ AL-
YONAN 289, 299-300, 328, 331 (Cairo 1947). See also N. HEER, InN TAYMIrYAH's EMPRCiSM
(unpublished).
49 TAQI AL-DIN InN TAYMiYVA, supra note 48, at 289.
50 On the classes of textual premises, see Anu HAmm AL-GHAZAU, supra note 8, at
155-56. Examples cited are not those of Thqi al-Din Ibn 'hymiyya but correspond perfectly to
his arguments.
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Here, the conclusion is formally and materially valid. Thus, whatever
form of argument is used, a certain middle term will surely lead to a
certain conclusion. In answer to the question of how one can know for
certain whether or not a universal proposition is true, Ibn Thymiyya
argues that statements derived from an infallible source (e.g., the Quran)
are always certain.
The fundamental idea underlying Ibn Thymiyya's theory of logic in
general, and legal logic in particular, is that the knowledge of the exter-
nal world results from the observation of particular things.51 Universal
propositions are inferred by analogy and induction from particular propo-
sitions. If it is true that analogy and induction yield probable knowledge,
our knowledge of the external world can only be probable. The only excep-
tion, however, is scriptural knowledge, which by virtue of being decreed
by God, can only be certain.52
IV. CONCLUSION
This brief analysis of the logic of legal reasoning in Islamic law and
common law has shown that the ultimate causes for difference between
the two systems stem from the obvious fact that Islamic law is steeped in
religion, whereas common law is a product of an essentially secular
culture. The effect of this fundamental difference manifests itself in two
main areas, the first of which is deductive and analogical reasoning. Law
in the common legal tradition is conceived as a man-made instrument of
social control which is in need of constant modification in line with social
change. Accordingly, judges in common law have persistently endeavored
to reason in keeping with the primal need of adapting law to current
reality. Deductive logic, as one method of reasoning, is viewed as suffi-
ciently stringent to disallow a gradual change in legal formulations. This
is why deduction is often rejected and referred to as "dry logic." The
ramifications of this attitude are even more evident in analogical reason-
ing. The similarity between two cases can justify an analogy on the basis
of a ratio which the new case dictates, rather than on the basis of a ratio
which the judge in the earlier case determined. Therefore, the similarity
between the two cases becomes that similarity which the current policy of
"ethics" and "justice" require. A change of this policy will most likely call
for a change in the similarity which will result in a different rule.
Islamic law can be said to be more consistent in the application of
logical principles, mainly because of the marginal importance of the ele-
ment of change in Islamic law. Being strictly religious, law is bound by
the letter and spirit of the fixed sources from which it is derived. In the
51 Tqi al-Din Ibn Thyrniyya can be said to have anticipated the theory of J. S. Mill. See
E. NAGEL, supra note 34, at 120-35.
52 TAQI AL-DIN IBN TAYMIYYA, supra note 48, at 319, 341; N. HEER, supra note 48.
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process of formulating the law, the Muslim jurist has no choice but to
abide by the prescription of these sources. In accordance with this concep-
tion, the current needs of society have no particular importance in deter-
mining the similarity between the two cases. The material similarity is
that which is dictated by the sources; any analogy to be drawn subse-
quently (which has been determined by scholars to be valid) must be
based on the already established similarity. Thus, logical consistency
takes priority over other considerations, including change.
Induction is the second area in which the difference between Islamic
law as a religious system and common law as a secular system manifests
itself. While induction serves as a method of legal reasoning in common
law, Islamic law takes induction beyond this limited scope to employ it for
the reinforcement of uncertain legal propositions. As demonstrated, in-
duction can bring greater certainty into law because the bulk of the legal
sources in Islam is defined and exhaustible.
All in all, Islamic law can be described as more "logical" than common
law. This is clearly the result of the absence of the consideration for
change in Islamic law. This seemingly positive characteristic of "log-
icism" has cost Islamic law a high price, manifesting itself in drastic
reforms in the modem era, including the wholesale borrowings of Euro-
pean codes to replace the inoperative traditional laws. Common law, on
the other hand, proved flexible enough to forestall the need for such
radical reforms.
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